Are you interested in learning about the intricate details of personal injury cases? Join us as we dive into the compelling medical malpractice and loss of consortium action filed by Dee Ann Abelar and Brian Abelar against Dr. Jeffrey Mora. The case of Dee Ann Abelar and Brian Abelar against Dr. Jeffrey Mora involves a medical malpractice claim and a loss of consortium claim. This case analysis examines the facts, legal proceedings, and key arguments presented by the parties. The court issued a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Mora, leading to an appeal by the plaintiffs. This analysis explores the court’s decision and the grounds for affirming the judgment.
Factual Background:
The plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action in December 2016 against a number of doctors, healthcare organizations, and hospitals. Dr. Mora was accused of professional negligence and loss of consortium in the complaint. Eight causes of action were included in the complaint, and all but two of them were resolved in Dr. Mora’s favor and an agreement was reached by the plaintiffs and the other defendants.
Dee Ann had a craniotomy on October 6, 2015, to remove a meningioma that was pressing on her optic nerve. This procedure started the chain of events that led to the lawsuit. Two days following the procedure, she was taken out of the hospital. Dee Ann had a grand mal seizure on November 20, 2015, and was treated quickly at a local hospital’s Emergency Department. She was admitted to the same hospital on November 30, 2015, as a result of her continuing seizures and other neurological issues. She was treated by numerous doctors during her stay, including Dr. Mora. The plaintiffs claim that Dr. Mora advised them to move Dee Ann to another hospital since the community hospital lacked the specialist expertise and resources necessary for her accurate diagnosis and care. Up until December 11, 2015, she remained in the hospital before being moved to USC Keck Medical Center. She underwent a second craniotomy there, during which pieces of her skull and brain were removed. The definitive diagnosis of an infection was made on December 19, 2015.
In their claim of professional negligence, the plaintiffs contend that Dee Ann was already battling an infection while under Dr. Mora’s care. They contend that Dr. Mora’s negligence in failing to recognize and treat the infection violated the accepted standard of care and was a factor in her injuries. In addition, the plaintiffs claim Brian, Dee Ann’s husband, suffered a loss of consortium.
The court approved Mora’s motion for summary judgment on November 20, 2020, finding in his favor. The court determined that Dr. Gold’s expert testimony proved Mora had no cause to believe Dee Ann had an illness while under his care. According to Dr. Gold, Mora requested the proper tests, was given the right medicine to treat her epilepsy, and there was no cause to suspect an infection based on the clinical data. The plaintiffs subsequently had to bear the burden of producing acceptable expert testimony, but because their expert’s declaration had been quashed as a punishment, they were unable to object to Mora’s request. As a result, the court found that the plaintiff’s medical negligence claim was not supported by any serious factual disputes. Consequently, Brian’s loss of consortium claim also failed as a matter of law.
Cost Memorandum
The court granted Mora’s request on December 15, 2020, and included a cost award that would be included in Mora’s cost memorandum. Within the allotted time, the plaintiffs appealed the ruling. In a cost memorandum submitted by Mora, he requested $13,978.63 in charges, which also included $8,637.33 for expert witness fees. The plaintiffs submitted a petition to lower the majority of the charges on Mora’s expense bill, claiming that they were either improper, excessive, or unnecessary for the case. They argued that Mora’s claim for expert witness costs under section 998 was unsupported by a written settlement offer. Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that any settlement proposals were made in bad faith, prematurely, and at an excessive price. Mora explained in response that he had attempted to settle with each plaintiff in May 2019, offering to waive costs in exchange for a dismissal with prejudice. The court granted Mora’s request on December 15, 2020, and included a cost award that would be included in Mora’s cost memorandum. Within the allotted time, the plaintiffs appealed the ruling.
Mora withdrew his request for those charges after acknowledging that some of the costs indicated in the cost memorandum were not recoupable.
The $420 that had previously been paid by the plaintiffs, the $60 filing fee that was not necessary for the case, and the $15 item without a receipt were all eliminated by the court in response to the petition to tax expenses. In addition, $630 in costs were eliminated since they were deemed superfluous for the case. The ruling was changed after the court granted the remaining cost items.
Abuse of authority
The court did not abuse its authority when it let Mora to depose Dr. Rand-Luby since it followed the guidelines outlined in the St. Mary case. According to St. Mary, “if there are reasonable doubts regarding the basis of the expert’s opinion, it is permissible for a party to depose an expert who delivers a declaration or affidavit in support of or opposition to summary judgment.By addressing questions of material fact without holding full trials, the restricted discovery method for the moving party is intended to speed up the summary judgment process.”
Concerning the proper scope of the sanction imposed, the court noted that “discovery sanctions must be tailored in order to remedy the offending party’s discovery abuse, should not give the aggrieved party more than what it is entitled to, and should not be used to punish the offending party.” (Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1217.)
The court ruled that the St. Mary rule applied in this case because there were legitimate concerns about the foundation of Dr. Rand-Luby’s findings. Dr. Rand-Luby’s declaration was unclear on her training and experience in relation to the plaintiff’s particular problems. Additionally, even though she cited a variety of sources for her beliefs, she did not offer any data or proof to back up her claims. The court’s decision to permit a constrained deposition of Dr. Rand-Luby to examine the basis for her opinions was therefore warranted.
Furthermore, the court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Dr. Rand-Luby’s declaration as evidence. The declaration made general and conclusory claims without offering enough concrete justification or evidence to support her evidence. The court’s rulings on Dr. Rand-Luby’s deposition and the exclusion of her declaration were consistent with accepted legal norms and did not amount to an abuse of its discretion.
Professional Negligence
In a professional negligence claim, the plaintiff must establish four elements:
(1) the defendant had a duty to use the same level of skill, prudence, and diligence as other professionals in the same field,
(2) the defendant breached that duty,
(3) the breach of duty directly caused the plaintiff’s injury, and
(4) the plaintiff suffered actual loss or damage as a result.
Medical professionals must adhere to a standard of care that calls for them to have the knowledge and skills that are typically possessed by practitioners in the same area and to use ordinary caution when applying that knowledge and skills to patient care.To establish the standard of care, expert testimony is typically required unless the required conduct is within the common knowledge of a layperson. The expert’s testimony must show sufficient subject-matter expertise to be accepted, and the jury decides how much weight to give it. In a similar vein, proving causation may also call for expert testimony if the problem is complicated and outside the realm of common knowledge. Expert views may be disregarded in a summary judgment hearing if they are conclusory, hypothetical, without support, or lacking sufficient certainty.
According to an examination of the accusations in the plaintiff’s complaint, a claim for professional negligence is sufficiently asserted. The plaintiffs claim that Dee Ann had an infection when Mora was treating her and that Mora’s failure to recognize and treat the infection violated the standard of care, causing or contributing to Dee Ann’s injuries. These allegations satisfy the requirements for a professional negligence claim.
The loss of consortium claim fails if the negligence claim fails
It is well-settled that “an unsuccessful personal injury suit by the physically injured spouse acts as an estoppel that bars the spouse who would claim damages for loss of consortium.” (Meighan v. Shore (1995), Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012)) To conclude the plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action fails, the court must also conclude the cause of action for loss of consortium fails.
Abuse of Discretion
The court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Mora ex parte application fees and expert witness fees as costs under section 998. The plaintiffs, in this case, contest the decision to award expert witness expenses as costson two grounds.
First, they contend that because defendant Mora failed to include copies of his written settlement offers in his cost memorandum, he is not entitled to expert witness fees under section 998. However, the court decides that Mora met the criterion because he timely provided copies of the settlement offers to the court and objected to the plaintiffs’ request for tax costs. Only in cases where costs have been contested in a move to tax costs is supporting documentation required.
Second, the plaintiffs claim that Mora’s settlement offers were invalid because they were made too soon and at an unreasonably low price. The court decides that Mora’s settlement offers were reasonable in light of the facts. The settlement offers were offered 2.5 years after the plaintiff’s complaint was filed, giving them plenty of time to assess the strength of their claim and get their own expert judgment on Mora’s liability. The promise to forego payment of costs was likewise judged to have substantial value by the court. Additionally, Mora’s settlement offer is assumed to have been reasonable because he won the petition for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs cited no facts indicating that Mora acted in bad faith or made his settlement offer solely to recover expert witness fees later. As indicated, the settlement proposals made to plaintiffs disclosed that Mora’s experts had assessed that Mora did not breach the standard of care or cause Dee Ann’s disabilities. Mora made a reasonable offer to settle the case for a low sum because he had a reasonable expectation that he would win the lawsuit. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that Mora acted in good faith.
Conclusion
The evidence presented and the use of legal principles helped the court to rule in Dr. Mora’s favor. The case emphasizes the value of expert testimony in establishing the appropriate level of care and demonstrating causation in claims of professional negligence. It also underlines the need for parties to act honestly when negotiating a settlement.